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Abstract
In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In
those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed
that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players.
In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that follow from a permission
structure on the set of players, in which players need permission to cooperate with other
players. We assume the permission structure to be an oriented tree. This means that there
is one player at the top of the permission structure and for every other player there is
a unique directed path from the top player to this player. We introduce a new solution
for these games based on the idea of the Average Tree value for cycle-free communication
graph games. We provide two axiomatizations for this new value and compare it with the
conjunctive permission value.
Keywords: TU game, restricted cooperation, permission structure, Shapley value, Aver-
age Tree value, axiomatization.
AMS subject classication: 91A12, 5C20
JEL code: C71
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU game, is a nite set of players
and for every coalition of players, a worth representing the total payo that the coalition
can obtain by cooperating. A value is a single-valued solution that assigns to every TU
game a payo vector whose components are the individual payos of the players. One of
the most applied solutions for cooperative TU games is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
In its classical interpretation, a TU game describes a situation in which the players
of every subset of the set of players is able to cooperate to form a feasible coalition and
earn its worth. In the literature various restrictions on coalition formation are developed.1
For example, in Myerson (1977) a coalition is feasible if it is a connected set in a given
communication graph on the set of players. The Myerson value for such so-called graph
games is the Shapley value of the corresponding Myerson restricted game in which the
worth of any coalition is the sum of the worths of its maximally connected subsets.
On the class of cycle-free graph games, the Average Tree value has been proposed
in Herings, van der Laan, and Talman (2008). Each player in a cycle-free graph game
can be associated with a particular payo vector introduced in Demange (2004), called
hierarchical outcome. The Average Tree value assigns to every cycle-free graph game
the average of its hierarchical outcomes. Both the Myerson value and the Average Tree
value are characterized by component eciency and some kind of fairness. Fairness of
the Myerson value states that, after deleting a link between two players, the payos of
these two players change by the same amount, see Myerson (1977). Component fairness
of the Average Tree value states that deleting a link between two players in a cycle-free
graph game yields the same average change in payo over the players in the two resulting
components, see Herings et al. (2008).
In van den Brink, Katsev, and van der Laan (2011) games on union closed systems
are considered. In such games the collection of feasible coalitions is closed under union,
meaning that for any pair of feasible coalitions also their union is feasible. This class
of union closed systems contains the class of antimatroids ; games on antimatroids have
been studied in Algaba, Bilbao, van den Brink, and Jimenez-Losada (2004). An example
of an antimatroid is a permission structure, where players need permission from their
superiors in a hierarchical structure, given by a directed graph, when they want to cooperate
with others. Games with a permission structure are considered in Gilles, Owen, and
van den Brink (1992), van den Brink and Gilles (1996), Gilles and Owen (1994), and
van den Brink (1997).2 In the rst two papers the conjunctive approach, in which each
1For a survey we refer to Bilbao (2000).
2Other models of games with a hierarchy on the set of players are, for example, Faigle and Kern (1992)
and Li and Li (2011).
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player needs permission of all its predecessors, is investigated, while in the latter two
papers the disjunctive approach is considered, in which a player needs permission of at
least one of its predecessors, if it has any. This leads to the conjunctive restricted game
and the disjunctive restricted game, in which the worth of a coalition is set equal to
its largest conjunctive and its largest disjunctive feasible subcoalition, respectively. The
corresponding conjunctive (disjunctive) permission value is then the Shapley value of the
induced conjunctive (disjunctive) restricted game. We restrict ourselves to games with
an oriented tree as permission structure, i.e., there is a unique top player, having no
predecessors, and for every other player there is a unique path from the top player to
this player. In this case the conjunctive and disjunctive approaches coincide and we refer
simply to the resulting restricted game as the permission game.
In this paper we dene and axiomatize a new value for games with an oriented
tree as permission structure. Given a digraph we obtain the associated undirected graph
by replacing every directed link from one node to another by an undirected link between
the two nodes. When the digraph is an oriented tree, the associated undirected graph is
cycle-free. To dene the new value, we rst take the induced permission game and then
apply the Average Tree value to this permission game on the associated undirected graph.
We provide two axiomatizations, one with and one without additivity. The rst
axiomatization uses axioms similar to those that characterize the conjunctive permission
value in van den Brink and Gilles (1996), but adding a collusion neutrality axiom in the
spirit of Haller (1994) and van den Brink (2012). The second one imposes a fairness
property related to the one in Herings et al. (2008) for cycle-free graph games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section on cooperative
TU games, the Average Tree value for cycle-free communication graph games, and games
with a permission structure. Section 3 introduces the Average Tree permission value for
games with a permission tree structure and provides the rst axiomatization. A character-
ization with a fairness property is given in Section 4. A comparison with the conjunctive
permission value is made in Section 5, where we modify the two axiomatizations of the
AT permission value to obtain new axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value.
Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 Cooperative games and restricted cooperation
2.1 Transferable utility games
A cooperative game with transferable utility in characteristic function form, or TU game, is
a pair (N; v), where N  IN is a nite set of jN j players and v : 2N ! IR is a characteristic
function, where v(;) = 0. A subset S 2 2N , S 6= ;, is called a coalition. For any coalition
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S, v(S) displays the worth of coalition S, which the members of coalition S are able to
divide among themselves when they decide to cooperate. For given player set N , we denote
the collection of all TU games on N by GN .
For T 2 2N n f;g, the unanimity game (N; uT ) in GN is given by the characteristic
function uT (S) = 1 if T  S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. For any (N; v) 2 GN , v can
be written in a unique way as a linear combination of the characteristic functions uT ,
T 2 2N n f;g; as v =PT22Nnf;gv(T )uT , where the real numbers v(T ) are the Harsanyi
dividends, see Harsanyi (1959).
For arbitrary K  IN, we denote IRK as the jKj-dimensional Euclidean space with
elements x 2 IRK having components xi, i 2 K. A payo vector of a game (N; v) 2 GN
is a vector x 2 IRN giving a payo xi 2 IR to every player i 2 N . A value for TU games
is a single-valued solution f that assigns to every TU game (N; v) 2 GN a payo vector
f(N; v) 2 IRN . A solution f is ecient if Pi2N fi(N; v) = v(N) for every (N; v) 2 GN .
The best-known solution is the Shapley value, denoted by Sh. This solution is ecient and
originally introduced by Shapley (1953) as the solution in which each player receives its
average marginal contribution to the coalitions when all orders of entrance (permutations)
of the players have equal probability. In terms of Harsanyi dividends the Shapley value is
given by Shi(N; v) =
P
fT22N ji2Tgv(T )=jT j, i 2 N; so the Harsanyi dividends v(T ) are
distributed uniformly over the players in coalition T:
2.2 TU games with graph structure
A graph is a pair (N;L) where N is a set of nodes and L  ffi; jg 2 2N ji 6= jg is a
set of unordered pairs of distinct elements of N . In this paper the nodes represent the
players in a game (N; v) and so we refer to them as players. The elements of L are called
links or edges . For j 2 N , we denote NL(j)  N as the set of neighbors of j in L, so
NL(j) = fh 2 N j fj; hg 2 Lg. The set of all graphs on N is denoted by LN .
For given S 2 2N n f;g and (N;L) 2 LN , the graph (S; L(S)) with L(S) = ffi; jg 2
Lji; j 2 Sg is the subgraph of L on S. Notice that L(N) = L. A sequence of k distinct
players (i1; :::; ik) is a path in L(S) if fi`; i`+1g 2 L(S) for ` = 1; :::; k   1. Two players
i; j 2 N are connected in (S; L(S)) if there is a path (i1; :::; ik) in L(S) with i1 = i and
ik = j. A subgraph (S; L(S)) is connected, or shortly coalition S is connected, if every two
players in S are connected in (S; L(S)). A coalition K  S is a component of (S; L(S)) if
K is a maximally connected subset of S, i.e., K is connected and for every i 2 S nK the
set K [ fig is not connected. The set of components of (S; L(S)) is denoted by L(S),
with L = L(N). The graph (N;L) is cycle-free if for every two dierent players i and
j either i and j are not connected or there is precisely one path in L connecting i and j.
When (N;L) is connected and cycle-free, then N is the unique component of (N;L) and
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(N;L) has precisely jN j   1 links. Following Beal, Remila and Solal (2010) (see also Beal,
Lardon, Remila and Solal (2012) for multi-choice forest games), we call N as well as each
of the two components in (N;L n ffi; jgg) a cone when (N;L) is connected and cycle-free.
Therefore, a connected cycle-free graph (N;L) has 2(jN j   1) + 1 cones.
A TU game with graph structure, shortly graph game, is a triple (N; v; L) with
(N; v) 2 GN and (N;L) 2 LN . We denote the collection of all TU games with graph
structure and player set N by GNL and the class of all cycle-free graph games on N by GNF .
A solution f on a subclass G of GNL assigns a unique payo vector f(N; v; L) 2 IRN to every
(N; v; L) 2 G.
For a graph game (N; v; L), Myerson (1977) introduced theMyerson restricted game
(N; vL) 2 GN ; dened by vL(S) = PT2L(S) v(T ) for every S 2 2N : The Myerson value,
denoted by My, is dened as My(N; v; L) = Sh(N; vL), for every (N; v; L) 2 GNL : The
Myerson value is characterized by component eciency and fairness, where a solution f
is component ecient if for any (N; v; L) 2 GNL it holds that
P
i2K fi(N; v; L) = v(K)
for every K 2 L and solution f satises fairness if for any (N; v; L) 2 GNL and any link
fi; jg 2 L it holds that fi(N; v; L) fi(N; v; Lnffi; jgg) = fj(N; v; L) fj(N; v; Lnffi; jgg).
On the class GNF of cycle-free graph games, Herings et al. (2008) introduce the
Average Tree value, denoted by AT. When the graph is connected, the AT value assigns
to each graph game (N; v; L) 2 GNF the average of jN j payo vectors. Each of these payo
vectors is associated with precisely one of the players, the so-called hierarchical outcome
for that player as introduced by Demange (2004). To dene the hierarchical outcome for
a particular player i 2 N , for each j 2 N let CLi (j) be dened as
CLi (j) = fh 2 N j the path in L from h to i contains jg:
Notice that CLi (i) = N and, for j 6= i, CLi (j) is the cone containing j that results from
deleting the rst link of the unique path in L from j to i. The hierarchical outcome
associated to player i is the vector ti(N; v; L) 2 IRN dened as
tij(N; v; L) = v(C
L
i (j)) 
X
h2CLi (j)\NL(j)
v(CLi (h)); j 2 N: (2.1)
The payo to player j in this vector is equal to the worth of the cone CLi (j) minus the
worths of the cones CLi (h) for the neighbors h of j in C
L
i (j). Since t
i
i(N; v; L) = v(N)  P
h2NL(i) v(C
L
i (h)); the hierarchical outcome t
i(N; v; L) is ecient.
On the class of connected cycle-free graph games, the AT value is then dened as
AT(N; v; L) =
1
jN j
X
i2N
ti(N; v; L):
If (N;L) is connected, the AT value depends only on the worths of the 2(jN j   1) + 1
cones. When (N;L) is not connected, the AT value is applied to each of the components
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in L, i.e., on each component K the AT value is the average of jKj hierarchical outcomes
of length K associated to each of the players in K. This construction denes the AT value
on the class of cycle-free graph games GNF :
On the class GNF ; the AT value is characterized by component eciency and compo-
nent fairness. For (N; v; L) 2 GNF , take K 2 L and link fi; jg 2 L(K). Then K consists
of two components in the graph (N;Lnffi; jgg), obtained from (N;L) by deleting the link
fi; jg. Let Kijh , h = i; j, denote the component of K that contains player h after deleting
the link fi; jg.3 Component fairness requires that, when deleting link fi; jg in L(K), the
resulting average change in payo to the players in Kiji is equal to the average change in
payo to the players in Kijj .
Axiom 2.1 Component Fairness
A solution f on the class GNF of cycle-free graph games satises component fairness if, for
every (N; v; L) 2 GNF and for any link fi; jg 2 L, it holds thatP
h2Kiji [fh(N; v; L)  fh(N; v; L n ffi; jgg)]
jKiji j
=
P
h2Kijj [fh(N; v; L)  fh(N; v; L n ffi; jgg)]
jKijj j
:
Theorem 2.2 (Herings, van der Laan, and Talman, 2008)
On the class GNF of cycle-free graph games, the AT value is the unique solution that satises
component eciency and component fairness.
Both the Myerson value and the AT value satisfy eciency on the class of connected
cycle-free graph games.
2.3 TU games with permission structure
A permission structure on the set of players of a TU game describes a situation where some
players need permission from other players to cooperate within a coalition. A permission
structure is assumed to be described by a directed graph, shortly digraph, (N;D) with the
nite set of players of the game N as the set of nodes and with set of arcs D  f(i; j) 2 N
N ji 6= jg a collection of ordered pairs of players in N . For a digraph (N;D), the undirected
graph (N;LD) on N associated to D is dened by LD = ffi; jg 2 2N n f;gj (i; j) 2 Dg.
The digraph (N;D) is connected if (N;LD) is connected, and a coalition K 2 2N n f;g is
a component of (N;D) if it is a component of (N;LD).
For a given digraph (N;D), node i is a predecessor of j and j is a successor of i if
(i; j) 2 D. A directed path in (N;D) from i to j is a sequence of distinct nodes (i1; : : : ; im)
such that i1 = i; im = j; and (ik; ik+1) 2 D for k = 1; : : : ;m  1. If there is a directed path
3When (N;L) is connected, then Kijh , h = i; j, are the two cones in L that result from deleting fi; jg.
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in (N;D) from node i to a dierent node j, then i is a superior of j and j is a subordinate
of i. A directed path from i to j is a cycle in (N;D) if (j; i) 2 D. The digraph (N;D) is
acyclic if it does not admit cycles. An acyclic digraph on a nite set has at least one top
node, being a node that has no predecessors. A digraph (N;D) is an oriented tree if it has
only one top node and from the top node to any other node there is precisely one directed
path in the digraph. The collection of all oriented trees on N is denoted by DNT . The
associated undirected graph (N;LD) of an oriented tree (N;D) 2 DNT is both connected
and cycle-free.
For an oriented tree (N;D) 2 DNT every node j 2 N , except the top node, has
a unique predecessor, denoted by pD(j). For i 2 N , SD(i) = fj 2 N j (i; j) 2 Dg
denotes the set of successors, bSD(i) denotes the set of subordinates, and bPD(i) denotes
the set of superiors of node i. Notice that in an oriented tree the top node is a superior
of any other node and that any other node is a subordinate of the top node. Finally, for
T 2 2N , we denote bSD(T ) = [i2T bSD(i) and bPD(T ) = [i2T bPD(i): Let i0 be the top node
of (N;D) 2 DNT , so bSD(i0) = N n fi0g.
A TU game with permission structure is a triple (N; v;D) with player set N , TU
game (N; v) 2 GN ; and digraph (N;D) on the set of players. A solution f on a class of
games with permission structure assigns a unique payo vector f(N; v;D) 2 IRN to every
(N; v;D) in the class. In a game with permission structure it is assumed that players
need permission of their predecessors to cooperate with other players. In the conjunctive
approach as introduced in Gilles et al. (1992) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996) it is
assumed that a player needs permission from all its predecessors, while in the disjunctive
approach as considered in Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997) it is assumed
that a player needs permission of at least one of its predecessors if it has any.
In this paper we consider the class of games with permission tree structure, shortly
permission tree games and denote this collection of games by GNT . On this class the con-
junctive and disjunctive approaches coincide and a coalition S 2 2N is feasible if for every
player j 2 S all its predecessors are members of S: It follows that all its superiors, includ-
ing the top node player, are members of S. The smallest feasible coalition containing S is
equal to F (S) = S [ bPD(S): The set of feasible coalitions is given by

D =

S 2 2N j8i 2 S n fi0g; pD(i) 2 S
	
= fS 2 2N jF (S) = Sg:
As shown by Algaba et al. (2004), the collection 
D is an antimatroid and is therefore
union closed,4 i.e., for every two sets S; T 2 
D it holds that S [ T 2 
D. There-
fore, for any S 2 2N , the largest feasible subset of S is uniquely dened and is equal to
4A collection of feasible coalitions A  2N is an antimatroid if, besides being union closed, it contains
the empty set and it satises accessibility meaning that S 2 A implies that there is a player i 2 S such
that S n fig 2 A, see Dilworth (1940) and Edelman and Jamison (1985).
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D(S) = [fT2
DjTSg T . The induced permission restricted game of a permission tree
game (N; v;D) 2 GNT is the game (N; vD) 2 GN given by
vD(S) = v(D(S)); S 2 2N ; (2.2)
i.e., the permission restricted game assigns to each coalition S 2 2N the worth of the largest
feasible subset of S in the game (N; v):
The conjunctive permission value ' is the solution that assigns to every game
(N; v;D) 2 GNT the Shapley value of the permission restricted game, '(N; v;D) = Sh(N; vD).
3 The Average Tree permission value
In this section, we introduce a new value on the class of permission tree games and charac-
terize it by a set of six independent axioms. The new value can be computed by applying
the AT value to the cycle-free graph game (N; vD; LD) which is associated with the per-
mission tree game (N; v;D) 2 GNT :
Denition 3.1 AT permission value
On the class GNT of permission tree games, the Average Tree (AT) permission value is the
function  given by
 (N; v;D) = AT(N; vD; LD); (N; v;D) 2 GNT :
To obtain the AT permission value of a permission tree game (N; v;D), rst the permission
restricted game (N; vD) is taken and then the Average Tree value is applied with (N;LD)
as the underlying graph.
We give a rst characterization of the AT permission value by means of six inde-
pendent axioms. The rst three axioms are also used in van den Brink and Gilles (1996)
to characterize the conjunctive permission value. Eciency states that the total sum of
payos equals the worth of the grand coalition.
Axiom 3.2 Eciency
For every (N; v;D) 2 GNT it holds that
P
i2N fi(N; v;D) = v(N).
Linearity is a straightforward generalization of the linearity axiom for TU games.
Axiom 3.3 Linearity
For every pair (N; v;D); (N;w;D) 2 GNT and real numbers  and  it holds that f(N;v+
w;D) = f(N; v;D) + f(N;w;D).
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Player i 2 N is a null player in (N; v) 2 GN if for all T  N n fig it holds that
v(T [ fig)   v(T ) = 0. Player i 2 N is an inessential player in the permission tree game
(N; v;D) 2 GNT if both i and all its subordinates in (N;D) are null players in (N; v). The
inessential player property states that inessential players earn zero payo.5
Axiom 3.4 Inessential player property
For every (N; v;D) 2 GNT it holds that if player i 2 N is an inessential player in (N; v;D),
then fi(N; v;D) = 0.
For T 2 2N , we call IntD(T ) = fi 2 T j NLD(i)  Tg the interior of coalition T in
(N;D). This set consists of all players in T whose neighbors all belong to T . Considering
the unanimity game of T , the players in the interior of T have no links going outside of
T , and thus they can only directly communicate with players within T . The next axiom
is a weak symmetry axiom and states that when (N; v) is the unanimity game of some
coalition T then all players in the interior of T get the same payo.
Axiom 3.5 Interior unanimity symmetry
For every T 2 2N n f;g, (N; uT ; D) 2 GNT ; and i; j 2 IntD(T ) it holds that fi(N; uT ; D) =
fj(N; u
T ; D).
Interior unanimity symmetry is related to the communication ability property for
graph games introduced by Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992) to characterize the Myerson
value. For connected graph games this latter axiom states that if all players are symmetric
in the Myerson restricted game, then they all get the same payo. In van den Brink, van
der Laan, and Pruzhansky (2011) this is weakened by requiring this only for the unanimity
game on the grand coalition.
The next axiom reects predecessor necessity and states that in case of a unanimity
game with respect to T , the payo distribution does not change if the predecessor of a
player in T is added to the unanimity game.
Axiom 3.6 Predecessor necessity
For every T 2 2N n f;g, (N; uT ; D) 2 GNT ; and j 2 T it holds that f(N; uT[fpD(j)g; D) =
f(N; uT ; D).
Interior unanimity symmetry and predecessor necessity are also satised by the
conjunctive permission value. The next axiom is not satised by the conjunctive permission
value. For TU games, Haller (1994) considers collusion neutrality properties, one of them
stating that when two players act together in the sense that either both players are together
5It weakens the null player property, which states that a null player earns zero payo.
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in a coalition or both stay out of a coalition, then the sum of the payos of the two players
does not change. For a similar collusion neutrality property, van den Brink (2012) shows
that there is no solution for TU games that satises eciency, collusion neutrality, and
the null player property, while on the class of communication graph games, all hierarchical
outcomes and their convex combinations, and thus also the AT value, do satisfy these three
properties when only collusion is allowed among neighbors. Here we restrict the axiom to
any two players that are neighbors in the permission structure. For a game (N; v) 2 GN
and two players i; j 2 N , the game in which players i and j act together is dened as
the game (N; vij) 2 GN given by vij(T ) = v(T n fi; jg) if fi; jg 6 T; and vij(T ) = v(T )
otherwise.
Axiom 3.7 Collusion neutrality
For every (N; v;D) 2 GNT and i; j 2 N with j 2 NLD(i) it holds that fi(N; vij; D) +
fj(N; v
ij; D) = fi(N; v;D) + fj(N; v;D).
The AT permission value is characterized by Axioms 3.2{3.7.
Theorem 3.8 On the class GNT of permission tree games, the AT permission value is the
unique solution that satises eciency, linearity, the inessential player property, interior
unanimity symmetry, predecessor necessity, and collusion neutrality.
Proof. For notational convenience, in the proof we denote the cone CLDi (j) of player j in
the associated undirected graph (N;LD) of (N;D) with respect to i by C
D
i (j) and the set
of neighbors NLD(j) of player j by ND(j):
We rst verify that the AT permission value satises all six axioms. Take any
(N; v;D) 2 GNT :
1. Since (N;D) 2 DNT , the associated undirected graph (N;LD) is connected and so
every vector ti(N; vD; LD), i 2 N , is ecient with respect to vD, thus
P
k2N t
i
k(N; vD; LD) =
vD(N). Also, since (N;D) 2 DNT , it holds that N 2 
D, and thus vD(N) = v(N). It follows
that  (N; v;D) is ecient.
2. Consider (N; v) and (N;w) in GN , real numbers ; ; and dene z = v + w.
Since zD(S) = z(D(S)) = v(D(S))+w(D(S)) = vD(S)+wD(S) for every S 2 2N ,
and ti is linear in its second argument, for every i 2 N , it follows that ti(N; zD; LD) =
ti(N;vD + wD; LD) = t
i(N; vD; LD) + t
i(N;wD; LD). Since the AT permission value
is the average over the vectors ti, it follows that  is linear.
3. Let j be an inessential player in (N; v;D). We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. When j is the unique top node in D, then all players are null players and v(T ) = 0
for all T 2 2N . It follows that vD(T ) = 0 for every T 2 2N and thus tij(N; vD; LD) = 0 for
all i 2 N . Taking the average over all i 2 N yields  j(N; vD; LD) = 0.
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Case 2. Next we consider the case that j is not the top node of (N;D). Take an arbitrary
player i 2 N and consider the vector ti(N; vD; LD). We show that tij(N; vD; LD) = 0.
First, when i is a subordinate of j, then CDi (j) \ND(j) contains the unique prede-
cessor of j, say h, while all other players in this set are successors of j. So,
tij(N; vD; LD) = vD(C
D
i (j))  vD(CDi (h)) 
X
k2CDi (j)\SD(j)
vD(C
D
i (k)):
For every k 2 CDi (j)\SD(j), the set CDi (k) is a set of subordinates of j and so D(CDi (k)) =
;. Further, since D is an oriented tree, both CDi (j) and CDi (h) are feasible in (N; v;D).
Hence,
tij(N; vD; LD) = v(C
D
i (j))  v(CDi (h)):
Since CDi (j)nCDi (h)  bSD(j)[fjg and j is inessential, it follows that v(CDi (j)) = v(CDi (h)),
and thus tij(N; vD; LD) = 0.
Second, when i is not a subordinate of j and i 6= j, then CDi (j) = bSD(j) [ fjg and
the neighbors of j within this set are his successors. So CDi (j)\NDi (j) = SD(j), and thus
tij(N; vD; LD) = vD(C
D
i (j)) 
X
h2SD(j)
vD(C
D
i (h)) = 0;
where the last equality follows from the fact that j is not the top node in (N;D), and
therefore D(C
D
i (k)) = ; for every k 2 SD(j) [ fjg.6
Third, we consider i = j. Since j is not the top node in D, j has precisely one
predecessor, say player k. From CDj (k) = N n (bSD(j) [ fjg) it follows that
tjj(N; vD; LD) = vD(N)  vD(N n (bSD(j) [ fjg)) Ph2SD(j) vD(CDj (h))
= v(N)  v(N n (bSD(j) [ fjg)) Ph2SD(j) v(;) = 0;
where the last equality follows from the fact that j is inessential, so v(N n (bSD(j)[fjg)) =
v(N): So,  satises the inessential player property.
4. Let T 2 2N and j 2 T be such that ND(j)  T . Take an arbitrary player i 6= j
and consider the vector ti(N; vD; LD). It holds that
tij(N; u
T
D; LD) = u
T
D(C
D
i (j)) 
P
h2CDi (j)\ND(j) u
T
D(C
D
i (h))
= uT (D(C
D
i (j))) 
P
h2CDi (j)\ND(j) u
T (D(C
D
i (h))):
Consider some h 2 CDi (j) \ ND(j): Since D(CDi (h))  CDi (h) and j =2 CDi (h) it holds
that j 2 T n D(CDi (h)); so uT (D(CDi (h))) = 0: Since ND(j)  T and i 6= j, there exists
6Note that the last equality also follows because all players in bSD(j) [ fjg are null players in (N; vD).
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a player k 2 ND(j) \ T that does not belong to CDi (j); so also not to D(CDi (j)): Since
k 2 T n D(CDi (j)); we have that uT (D(CDi (j))) = 0:
When i = j, then
tjj(N; u
T
D; LD) = u
T
D(N) 
X
h2ND(j)
uTD(C
D
j (h)) = u
T (N) 
X
h2ND(j)
uT (D(C
D
j (h))) = 1;
where the second equality follows from N 2 
D and the last equality follows because for
every h 2 ND(j) it holds that D(CDj (h)) does not contain j 2 T . Taking the average over
all i 2 N , it follows that  j(N; uT ; D) = 1jN j ; independent of the choice of j 2 T such that
ND(j)  T . So,  satises interior unanimity symmetry.
5. Take T 2 2N and j 2 T: We show that uTD = uT[fpD(j)gD : If T 6 S, then both
T 6 D(S) and T [ fpD(j)g 6 D(S), which implies uT[fpD(j)gD (S) = uTD(S) = 0. If T  S
and T 6 D(S), then also T [fpD(j)g 6 D(S), which implies uT[fpD(j)gD (S) = uTD(S) = 0:
Finally, consider the case T  S and T  D(S): It holds that uTD(S) = uT (D(S)) = 1:
Since T  D(S) and D(S) 2 
D; it holds that F (T )  D(S); so in particular pD(j) 2
D(S): We have that u
T[fpD(j)g
D (S) = u
T[fpD(j)g(D(S)) = 1: So,  satises predecessor
necessity.
6. Let j 2 ND(i) and without loss of generality assume that i = pD(j). Let S 2 2N
be a set that contains both i and j. It holds that j 2 D(S) if and only if i 2 D(S): Now,
for some k 2 N , consider tk(N; vD; LD).
First, suppose that j 2 CDk (i): We dene Oi = (CDk (i) \ ND(i)) n fjg and Oj =
CDk (j) \ND(j). Notice that i 62 Oj because j 2 CDk (i). It holds that
tki (N; vD; LD) = vD(C
D
k (i))  vD(CDk (j)) 
P
h2Oi vD(C
D
k (h));
tkj (N; vD; LD) = vD(C
D
k (j)) 
P
h2Oj vD(C
D
k (h)):
We obtain that
tki (N; vD; LD) + t
k
j (N; vD; LD) = vD(C
D
k (i)) 
P
h2Oi[Oj vD(C
D
k (h))
= v(D(C
D
k (i))) 
P
h2Oi[Oj v(D(C
D
k (h)))
= vij(D(C
D
k (i))) 
P
h2Oi[Oj v
ij(D(C
D
k (h)))
= tki (N; (v
ij)D; LD) + t
k
j (N; (v
ij)D; LD);
where the third equality follows because both i and j are in CDk (i) and thus either both are
in D(C
D
k (i)) or both are not, and i and j are both not in C
D
k (h) for every h 2 Oi[Oj and
so also not in D(C
D
k (h)). Similar, the same equality holds when i 2 CDk (j). By taking
the average over all k 2 N , it follows that  satises collusion neutrality.
Next we prove that the six axioms determine a unique solution f . First, for the unanimity
game (N; uN ; D) it holds by eciency and interior unanimity symmetry that fi(N; u
N ; D) =
11
1=jN j; i 2 N . Next we determine by induction the payos of the unanimity games of all
feasible sets.
Take any t, 1  t < jN j, and assume that f(N; uT ; D) is uniquely determined for all
T 2 
D with jT j > t: Take any T 2 
D with jT j = t. Since T is feasible, for every i 62 T
it holds that also all subordinates of i are not in T and so i is inessential in (N; uT ; D).
Thus, for any i =2 T , fi(N; uT ; D) = 0 by the inessential player property. To determine
the payos of the players in T , for a player i 2 T such that SD(i) n T 6= ;, take a player
j 2 SD(i)nT . Since T is feasible also T 0 = T [fjg is feasible and jT 0j = t+1. Since j 62 T ,
fj(N; u
T ; D) = 0. Applying collusion neutrality to v = uT and observing that vij = uT
0
it
follows that
fi(N; u
T ; D) = fi(N; u
T ; D) + fj(N; u
T ; D)
= fi(N; (u
T )ij; D) + fj(N; (u
T )ij; D)
= fi(N; u
T 0 ; D) + fj(N; u
T 0 ; D):
By the induction hypothesis, fi(N; u
T 0 ; D) and fj(N; u
T 0 ; D) are uniquely determined, and
therefore fi(N; u
T ; D) is uniquely determined. So, we are left to determine the payos of
the players in the set bT = fh 2 T jSD(h)nT = ;g. For every i 2 bT it holds that ND(i)  T ,
because T is feasible and SD(i) nT = ;. From interior unanimity symmetry it follows that
all players in bT have equal payo. These payos then follow from eciency. By induction
it is shown that f(N; uT ; D) is uniquely determined for every feasible T 2 
D.
Take any T 62 
D: Predecessor necessity implies f(N; uT ; D) = f(N; uT[fpD(j)g; D)
for every j 2 T . Adding subsequently all players in bPD(T )nT , we obtain that f(N; uT ; D) =
f(N; uF (T ); D) and so the payos for every unanimity game are uniquely determined.
Finally, f(N; v;D) is uniquely determined by linearity for every (N; v;D) 2 GNT . 
Note that collusion between two neighbors in the restricted game is not the same
as taking the restricted game after two neighbors colluded. Consider, for example the
game with permission structure (N; v;D) 2 GNT with N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, v = uf1;3g; and
D = f(1; 2); (2; 3); (2; 4)g. Taking S = f1; 2; 3g we see that (vD)24(S) = vD(f1; 3g) =
v(f1g) = 0, while (v24)D(S) = v24(f1; 2; 3g) = v(f1; 3g). If (vij)D would always be equal
to (vD)
ij, then collusion neutrality would follow immediately from van den Brink (2012),
who shows that when two neighbors in an undirected communication graph collude then
the sum of their payos does not change in every hierarchical outcome, and thus any of
their convex combinations including the AT value.
Next, we show the logical independence of the six axioms of Theorem 3.8.
1. The conjunctive permission value satises eciency, linearity, the inessential player
property, interior unanimity symmetry, and predecessor necessity. It does not satisfy
12
collusion neutrality.
2. The solution f(N; v;D) = AT(N; v; LD) that applies the Average Tree value to the
original game v on the associated undirected graph LD satises eciency, linearity,
the inessential player property, interior unanimity symmetry, and collusion neutrality.
It does not satisfy predecessor necessity.
3. The solution that assigns all worth v(N) to the top node and zero to all other players
satises eciency, linearity, the inessential player property, predecessor necessity, and
collusion neutrality. It does not satisfy interior unanimity symmetry.
4. The equal division solution given by fi(N; v;D) = v(N)=jN j for all i 2 N satises
eciency, linearity, interior unanimity symmetry, predecessor necessity, and collusion
neutrality. It does not satisfy the inessential player property.
5. For (N; v;D) 2 GNT , let (N; v) 2 GN be given by v = v(N)uNnI(N;v;D); where
I(N; v;D) is the set of inessential players in (N; v;D). The solution f(N; v;D) =
 (N; v;D) satises eciency, the inessential player property, interior unanimity sym-
metry, predecessor necessity, and collusion neutrality. It does not satisfy linearity.
6. The zero solution given by fi(N; v;D) = 0 for all i 2 N satises linearity, the
inessential player property, interior unanimity symmetry, predecessor necessity, and
collusion neutrality. It does not satisfy eciency.
We end this section by mentioning that in Theorem 3.8 predecessor necessity can
be replaced by independence of irrelevant coalitions as used by van den Brink, Katsev,
and van der Laan (2011) for games on union closed systems, stating that the payo only
depends on the worths of feasible coalitions. A similar axiom, called connectedness , is used
by van den Brink, van der Laan, and Pruzhansky (2011) for communication graph games,
saying that the payos only depend on the worths of connected coalitions.
4 An axiomatization using fairness
In this section we characterize the AT permission value by modifying the component fair-
ness Axiom 2.1 to the framework of permission tree games.
We say that in a permission tree game (N; v;D) 2 GNT some player i 2 N is en-
forcing power over player j 2 N when i vetoes any coalition that contains j or any of its
subordinates but does not contain player i. Since i is a predecessor of j, and thus is a
superior of every player in cone Kijj , any h 2 Kijj has j as one of its superiors and thus
also needs permission of i: So, the players in Kijj cannot cooperate without permission of
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player i. It follows that D(K
ij
j ) = ;; i.e., in the permission structure (N;D) the players in
Kijj earn worth zero without permission from player i. On the other hand, neither player
i nor any of the predecessors of player i can force the players in Kijj to cooperate. The
corresponding game in which the players in fjg [ bSD(j) are not cooperating is the game
(N; v ij) 2 GN given by v ij(T ) = v(T n (fjg [ bSD(j))) for all T 2 2N .
Applying a similar idea as component fairness, but now with respect to the enforce-
ment of permission power, we obtain the following axiom.
Axiom 4.1 Permission Component Fairness
A solution f on the class GNT of permission tree games satises permission component
fairness if, for every (N; v;D) 2 GNT and for any link (i; j) 2 D, it holds thatP
h2Kiji [fh(N; v;D)  fh(N; v
 ij; D)]
jKiji j
=
P
h2Kijj [fh(N; v;D)  fh(N; v
 ij; D)]
jKijj j
:
The following theorem characterizes the AT permission value by eciency, the inessential
player property, and permission component fairness.
Theorem 4.2 On the class GNT of permission tree games, the AT permission value is the
unique solution that satises eciency, the inessential player property, and permission
component fairness.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3.8 that the AT permission value satises eciency and
the inessential player property. To prove that the AT permission value satises permission
component fairness, take any arc (i; j) 2 D: Then all players in Kijj are inessential in
(N; v ij; D); soX
h2Kijj
 h(N; v
 ij; D) = 0:
Since the AT permission value is ecient, we have thatX
h2Kiji
 h(N; v
 ij; D) = v ij(N) 
X
h2Kijj
 h(N; v
 ij; D) = v(Kiji ):
For permission component fairness to hold, we therefore have to show thatP
h2Kijj  h(N; v;D)
jKijj j
=
P
h2Kiji  h(N; v;D)  v(K
ij
i )
jKiji j
:
Recall that the AT permission value  is dened as the AT value applied to the cycle-free
graph game (N; vD; LD), so as the average of the jN j hierarchical outcomes of the game
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(N; vD) on the graph (N;LD), each one associated to precisely one of the players. The
hierarchical outcome associated with player k 2 N gives to player ` 2 N payo
tk` (N; vD; LD) = vD(C
LD
k (`)) 
X
h2CLDk (`)\NLD (`)
vD(C
LD
k (h)); ` 2 N:
Consider any arc (i; j) 2 D. When k 2 Kiji , then CLDk (j) = Kijj and so the total payo
at vector tk(N; vD; LD) to the players in K
ij
j is equal to vD(K
ij
j ). Since vD(K
ij
j ) = 0, it
follows that the players in Kijj get total payo equal to zero in jKiji j of the jN j hierarchical
outcomes. When k 2 Kijj , then CLDk (i) = Kiji and so the total payo at vector tk(N; vD; LD)
to the players inKiji is equal to vD(K
ij
i ) = v(K
ij
i ). From eciency it follows that the players
in Kijj get total payo equal to v(N)  v(Kiji ). This occurs in jKijj j of the jN j hierarchical
outcomes. It follows thatX
h2Kijj
 h(N; v;D) =
jKijj j(v(N)  v(Kiji ))
jN j : (4.3)
From the reasoning above it also follows that the players in Kiji get total payo equal to
v(Kiji ) in the jKijj j of the jN j hierarchical outcomes where k 2 Kijj , and they get total
payo v(N) in the jKiji j of the jN j hierarchical outcomes where k 2 Kiji . So,X
h2Kiji
 h(N; v;D) =
jKijj jv(Kiji ) + jKiji jv(N)
jN j :
Substituting jKijj j = jN j   jKiji j in the latter equation yieldsX
h2Kiji
 h(N; v;D)  v(Kiji ) =
jKiji j
 
v(N)  v(Kiji )

jN j : (4.4)
From equations (4.3) and (4.4) it follows that  satises permission component fairness.
It remains to show that the three axioms characterize a unique solution. Let f be
a solution satisfying the three axioms. Then eciency requires thatX
h2N
fh(N; v;D) = v(N) (4.5)
and permission component fairness requiresP
h2Kiji [fh(N; v;D)  fh(N; v
 ij; D)]
jKiji j
=
P
h2Kijj [fh(N; v;D)  fh(N; v
 ij; D)]
jKijj j
; (i; j) 2 D:
All players in Kijj are inessential in (N; v
 ij; D); so by the inessential player propertyX
h2Kijj
fh(N; v
 ij; D) = 0; (i; j) 2 D:
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Since f is ecient, we have thatX
h2Kiji
fh(N; v
 ij; D) = v ij(N) 
X
h2Kijj
fh(N; v
 ij; D) = v(Kiji ); (i; j) 2 D:
We nd thatP
h2Kijj fh(N; v;D)
jKijj j
=
P
h2Kiji fh(N; v;D)  v(K
ij
i )
jKiji j
; (i; j) 2 D: (4.6)
Since (N;D) 2 DNT , the number of arcs in D is equal to jN j   1. So, the total number of
equations in (4.5) and (4.6) is jN j. Since all jN j equations are linearly independent, the
system in (4.5) and (4.6) has a unique solution in the jN j variables fh(N; v;D), h 2 N . 
The three axioms of Theorem 4.2 are logically independent. The equal division so-
lution satises eciency and permission component fairness, but not the inessential player
property. The conjunctive permission value satises eciency and the inessential player
property, but not permission component fairness. Finally, the zero solution satises the
inessential player property and permission component fairness, but not eciency.
5 Comparison with the conjunctive permission value
In this section we compare the Average Tree permission value with the conjunctive permis-
sion value dened in Subsection 2.3. As shown in the rst case under logical independence
in Section 3, the conjunctive permission value satises all axioms of Theorem 3.8 except
collusion neutrality. It turns out that strengthening interior unanimity symmetry by re-
quiring that all players in T get the same payo in (N; uT ; D), and not only the interior
players, we can delete collusion neutrality to obtain an axiomatization of the conjunctive
permission value.
Axiom 5.1 Unanimity symmetry
For every T 2 2N n f;g, (N; uT ; D) 2 GNT ; and i; j 2 T it holds that fi(N; uT ; D) =
fj(N; u
T ; D).
Theorem 5.2 On the class GNT of permission tree games the conjunctive permission value
is the unique solution that satises eciency, linearity, the inessential player property,
unanimity symmetry, and predecessor necessity.
Proof. It is known from van den Brink and Gilles (1996) that the conjunctive permission
value satises eciency, linearity, and the inessential player property. Unanimity symmetry
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follows from symmetry7 of the Shapley value and the fact that i; j 2 T are symmetric
players in (N; uTD) = (N; u
bPD(T )). Predecessor necessity follows since uTD = uT[fpD(j)gD for
all T  N and j 2 T .
We are left to show uniqueness. Suppose that f satises the ve axioms and consider
the unanimity game (N; uT ; D); T 2 
D. Similar as in the proof of Theorem 3.8, since
T is feasible, for every i 62 T it holds that also all subordinates of i are not in T and so
i is inessential in (N; uT ; D). Thus fi(N; u
T ; D) = 0 by the inessential player property.
From unanimity symmetry it follows that all players in T have equal payo. These payos
then follow from eciency. If T 62 
D then, similar as in the proof of Theorem 3.8,
by predecessor necessity we have that f(N; uT ; D) = f(N; uF (T ); D). Hence, for every
unanimity game the payos are uniquely determined by eciency, the inessential player
property, unanimity symmetry, and predecessor necessity. Finally, f(N; v;D) is uniquely
determined by linearity for every (N; v;D) 2 GNT . 
Theorems 3.8 and 5.2 show an important dierence between the conjunctive per-
mission value and AT permission value. By unanimity symmetry, in a unanimity game
the conjunctive permission value treats all the players in T the same. Similar to the AT
value for cycle-free communication graph games, in the AT permission value the players in
T who have neighbors outside T have some `responsibility' or `representability' for these
players. Therefore, the interior players are treated equally, but the other players in T ,
i.e., the `boundary' players, earn a payo that depends on the substructure where they are
the top player and that contains them and their subordinates. This is taken care for by
collusion neutrality which, at each step, assigns some `joint payo' to a player and one of
its successors when they collude.
The next ve solutions show that the ve axioms of Theorem 5.2 are logically inde-
pendent. For each solution we state the four axioms satised by the solution, consequently
it does not satisfy the fth axiom. The solution fi(N; v;D) = My(N; v; LD) satises
eciency, linearity, the inessential player property, and unanimity symmetry. The AT per-
mission value satises eciency, linearity, the inessential player property, and predecessor
necessity. The equal division solution satises eciency, linearity, unanimity symmetry,
and predecessor necessity. The solution f dened at the end of Section 3 (as fth alterna-
tive solution showing logical independence of the axioms in Theorem 3.8) satises eciency,
the inessential player property, unanimity symmetry, and predecessor necessity. Finally,
the zero solution given by fi(N; v;D) = 0 for all i 2 N satises linearity, the inessential
player property, unanimity symmetry, and predecessor necessity.
7A TU game solution f is symmetric if for every TU game (N; v) and every pair i; j 2 N such that
v(S [ fig) = v(S [ fjg) for every S 2 2Nnfi;jg, it holds that fi(N; v) = fj(N; v).
17
Next, we modify permission component fairness to get an axiomatization of the
conjunctive permission value. Similar as in Section 4, consider an arc (i; j) 2 D and
suppose that player i is enforcing its power over j in the sense that it does not allow player
j and all its subordinates to act. Then player j and all its subordinates, i.e., the players
in Kijj ; become null players. On the other hand, the players in K
ij
j can refuse to cooperate
with the players in Kiji : Applying a similar idea as Myerson's fairness, but now with respect
to the enforcement of permission power, we obtain the following axiom.
Axiom 5.3 Permission Fairness
A solution f on the class GNT of permission tree games satises permission fairness if, for
every (N; v;D) 2 GNT and for any pair i; j 2 N with (i; j) 2 D, it holds that
fi(N; v;D)  fi(N; v ij; D) = fj(N; v;D)  fj(N; v ij; D):
Replacing in Theorem 4.2 permission component fairness by this permission fairness
characterizes the conjunctive permission value.
Theorem 5.4 On the class GNT of permission tree games, the conjunctive permission value
is the unique solution that satises eciency, the inessential player property, and permis-
sion fairness.
Proof. It is known that the conjunctive permission value ' satises eciency and the
inessential player property. To show permission fairness, consider (N; v;D) 2 GNT and
i; j 2 N with (i; j) 2 D. According to Proposition 2.3 in van den Brink and Gilles (1996),
it follows by applying the dividend formula of the Shapley value that
'i(N; v;D) =
X
fT22N ji2F (T )g
v(T )=jF (T )j; i 2 N:
We therefore have that
'i(N; v;D)  'i(N; v ij; D) =
P
T22N
i2F (T )
v(T )
jF (T )j  
P
T22N
i2F (T )

v ij (T )
jF (T )j
=
P
T22N
i2F (T )
v(T )
jF (T )j  
P
T22N
i2F (T );j 62F (T )
v(T )
jF (T )j
=
P
T22N
fi;jgF (T )
v(T )
jF (T )j =
P
T22N
j2F (T )
v(T )
jF (T )j = 'j(N; v;D);
where the second equality follows since v ij(T ) = v(T ) if j 62 F (T ), and v ij(T ) = 0
otherwise, and the fourth equality follows since j 2 F (T ) implies that i 2 F (T ) for all
T 2 2N . Since 'j(N; v ij; D) = 0 by the inessential player property, it follows that '
satises permission fairness.
We show uniqueness by induction on the cardinality of the set I(N; v;D) of inessen-
tial players. Let (N; v;D) 2 GNT and i0 2 N be the top player in (N;D). If jI(N; v;D)j =
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jN j, i.e., all players are inessential, then the inessential player property implies that
fi(N; v;D) = 0 for all i 2 N . If jI(N; v;D)j = jN j   1 then all players in N n fi0g are
inessential players, and thus the inessential player property implies that fi(N; v;D) = 0
for all i 2 N n fi0g. Eciency then determines that fi0(N; v;D) = v(N).
Proceeding by induction, assume that f(N; v0; D) is determined when jI(N; v;D)j =
k, 1  k  jN j   1, and suppose that jI(N; v;D)j = k  1. The inessential player property
implies that fi(N; v;D) = 0 for all i 2 I(N; v;D). For every i 2 N n (I(N; v;D) [ fi0g)
and j = pD(i), permission fairness requires that
fi(N; v;D)  fi(N; v ij; D) = fj(N; v;D)  fj(N; v ij; D): (5.7)
Since the payos fi(N; v
 ij; D) and fj(N; v ij; D) are determined by the induction hy-
pothesis, and (N;D) is an oriented tree this yields jN j   jI(N; v;D)j   1 linear equations.
Together with eciencyX
h2N
fh(N; v;D) = v(N); (5.8)
the total number of equations is jN j   jI(N; v;D)j. Since these equations are linearly
independent, the system of jN j jI(N; v;D)j equations (5.7) and (5.8) has a unique solution
in the jN j   jI(N; v;D)j variables fh(N; v;D), h 2 N n I(N; v;D). 
Note that, whereas in the uniqueness part of the proof of Theorem 4.2, for every
arc in the permission structure permission component fairness yields a non-trivial equation
resulting in jN j   1 linear independent equations, in the proof of Theorem 5.4 permission
fairness does not give a new equation like (5.7) if i is an inessential player since v ij = v
(with j = pD(i)) in that case. But using the inessential player property to x the payos of
the inessential players, permission fairness gives jN j   jI(N; v;D)j   1 linear independent
equations which, together with eciency, determine the payos of the other players.
The three axioms of Theorem 5.4 are logically independent. The equal division
solution satises eciency and permission fairness, but not the inessential player property.
The AT permission value satises eciency and the inessential player property, but not
permission fairness. Finally, the zero solution satises the inessential player property and
permission fairness, but not eciency.
We nally remark that the conjunctive permission value does not satisfy fairness
in the sense that deleting an arc yields the same change in payo for the two players
incident with that arc, even on classes where it is allowed to delete arcs.8 As shown in van
den Brink (1997) this does hold for the disjunctive permission value when deleting an arc
8Note that, considering D as a permission structure, deleting arc (i; j) 2 D has as eect that j can
cooperate with all feasible coalitions within Kijj .
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where the successor has at least two predecessors but not when the successor has only one
predecessor. Therefore this fairness axiom `has no bite' for permission tree games. This
shows an important dierence between stating fairness axioms in terms of deleting arcs or
enforcing power. Also, we can extend the AT permission value to more general permission
structures by applying the (arc) fairness properties used in van den Brink (1997).
We end this section with an example illustrating some dierences between the con-
junctive permission value and the AT permission value.
Example 5.5 Consider the game (N; v;D) with player set N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, character-
istic function v = uf2;4g and permission structure D = f(1; 2); (1; 3); (3; 4); (3; 5)g. The
conjunctive permission value assigns payo vector '(N; v;D) = (1=4; 1=4; 1=4; 1=4; 0) and
the AT permission value  (N; v;D) = (1=5; 1=5; 1=5; 2=5; 0): By the inessential player
property, in both payo vectors player 5 has payo zero. By unanimity symmetry, in
the conjunctive permission value all other players earn 1=4. This is not the case for the
AT permission value payos. By interior unanimity symmetry the players 1; 2; and 4
earn the same. By collusion neutrality, players 3 and 5 together earn the same as in
 (N; uN ; D) = (1=5; 1=5; 1=5; 1=5; 1=5). Since  5(N; v;D) = 0, we obtain  3(N; v;D) =
2=5 and so  1(N; v;D) =  2(N; v;D) =  4(N; v;D) = 1=5.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied games with an oriented tree as permission structure. Since in
such games players can only generate a surplus if they get permission to collaborate from
all their superiors, only coalitions containing the superiors of all players involved in the
coalition can form. In van den Brink and Gilles (1996) the conjunctive permission value
for this class of games is introduced.
We show that the axioms of eciency, linearity, the inessential player property,
predecessor necessity, interior unanimity symmetry, and collusion neutrality characterize a
unique value, the AT permission value. The AT permission value can also be axiomatized
by eciency, the inessential player property, and permission component fairness. The AT
permission value can be easily computed as the average of jN j hierarchical outcomes, where
jN j is the number of players. Each hierarchical outcome is an jN j-dimensional payo vector,
whose values can be found by the evaluation of jN j simple and explicit linear expressions.
We also evaluate the connection between the AT permission value and the con-
junctive permission value. If we strengthen the interior unanimity symmetry axiom to
unanimity symmetry and drop the collusion neutrality axiom, we obtain a new axiom-
atization for the conjunctive permission value. When we replace permission component
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fairness by permission fairness, we obtain another new axiomatization of the conjunctive
permission value.
Several games in the economic literature turn out to be the conjunctive restricted
game on an appropriate digraph, such as the auction games of Graham, Marshall and
Richard (1990), the so-called DR-polluted river game of Ni and Wang (2007) and its gen-
eralization in Dong, Ni and Wang (2012), and the dual of the airport game of Littlechild
and Owen (1973), see also Bra^nzei, Fragnelli and Tijs (2002). These papers study the Shap-
ley value of the corresponding game which is a special case of the conjunctive permission
value. As an alternative the AT permission value can be studied for these applications.
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